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INTRODUCTION 
Comparable worth may justifiably be called the 
"women's issue" of the 1980s (Norton, EEOC Chair, cited in 
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), 1981; Doherty & Harriman, 
1981). One cannot ignore the virtual deluge of newspaper, 
magazine, professional journal articles, and books 
attempting to address some aspect of the comparable worth 
controversy. Pay commensurate with the worth of a job is 
certainly not a new concept. A Biblical parable CV'att. 20, 
New American Standard Bible, 1977) describes the anger that 
vineyard laborers expressed toward their employer for uhat 
they perceived to be inequitable compensation: Workers who 
had started at the end of the day received the same wage as 
workers who had arrived at dawn! The annals of world 
history chronicle the names of employers, employees, 
philosophers, economists, and government officials who have 
debated the worth of human labor and the distribution of 
the products of that labor (i.e., income) (Mahoney, 1983). 
During the short history of the United States, a variety of 
societal pressures pertaining to human labor have become 
embodied into law. Legislation, judicial rulings, and 
executive orders have attempted to redistribute income to 
the needy, safeguard employees' rights, and regulate 
organizations' personnel practices (e.g., fair selection 
approaches; reasonable pay for one's labor). Over the past 
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century, some of those laws were directed at the growing 
numbers of working women. Within the past decade, more 
attention has been focused on the persistent differences in 
men and women's pay, and the reasons for that difference. 
Persons differ on the solution to the problem of unfair pay 
differentials. Some advocate no action and argue that the 
salary gap will eventually close without remedial actions, 
others insist that immediate, prescriptive action be taken. 
As attempts to provide for nondiscriminatory compensation, 
some states have enacted comparable worth statutes (e.g., 
Iowa, Michigan, Washington) (Arthur Young & Co., undated; 
Arthur Young & Co., 1984; Cook, 1983; Remick, 1983). For 
example, the Iowa statute establishes "the policy of this 
state that a state department, board, commission, or agency 
shall not discriminate in compensation for work of 
comparable worth between jobs held predominantly by women 
and jobs held predominantly by men." Comparable worth is 
"measured by the composite of the skill, effort, 
responsibility, and working conditions normally required in 
the performance of the work". Opponents of comparable 
worth have rallied against such legislation, labelling it 
as unnecessary and prohibitively expensive for American 
business (Rabkin, 1984; Williams, 1984). To understand the 
flurry of comparable worth legislative activity (Rothchild, 
1983), one must consider those statutes and rulings that 
form the basis for the comparable worth concept. 
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Legislative and Jud i c ia1 History o f Equal Pay and 
Copparable Worth 
Although the issues surrounding the equal pay and 
comparable worth are often perceived as recent 
developments, the question of wage discrimination in the 
United States arose during World War II. Conscription of 
white males left many jobs unfilled. Manufacturers 
recruited women and minorities for those jobs, many jobs 
from which women and minorities had previously been barred. 
As part of this influx of new workers, problems of pay 
inequity developed and were addressed to the National War 
Labor Board. The National War Labor Board det erziined that 
it was unfair to pay women and minorities less than white 
males for the same work. The Board very narrowly defined 
wage discrimination as unequal pay for equal work. But, 
the Board referred any "comparable worth" questions to the 
manufacturers and unions for negotiation. At the very 
least, however, the Board did force an awareness that the 
content of work should be evaluated in the process of 
setting wages (Kilkovich & Broderick, 1982). 
The issue of wage discrimination resurfaced in the 
1960s, and the same narrow focus that the National War 
Labor Board had taken tended to prevail. The Equal Pay Act 
of 1963 requires that jobs with substantially similar job 
duties be paid equally. Female plumbers must be paid the 
s a m e  as male plumbers employed by the same company, for 
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example. Four factors determine the equality of jobs: 
skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions. It 
is not sufficient for a company to change job titles in an 
effort to avoid paying females the same wages males receive 
to do similar work. There are, however, four exceptions to 
the Equal Pay Act's requirements: If the employer can 
justify pay differences that appear to be sex-based for 
reasons of seniority, merit, work quantity (i.e., piece 
rate), or any factor other than sex. This final 
requirement has been the most difficult to interpret of the 
four, and has been the one most successfully used by 
defendants (Fulghum, 1983). Comparable worth, per se, was 
not addre s s ed by the Ac t, a11 hough the Kennedy 
administration initially proposed the concept during the 
drafting of the Act (Doherty & Earriman, 1981). Congress 
rejected the comparable worth concept, preferring to limit 
the law to equal pay for equal work. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination in any area of employment on the basis of 
color, religion, race, sex or national origin. Employers 
of 15 or more employees are bound by the provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act, which includes express prohibition of 
discrimination on those bases in compensation whether the 
compensation be wages, fringe benefits, training or use of 
facilities. As in the Equal Pay Act, the Civil Rights Act 
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did not specifically address the comparable worth concept 
of compensation, although it did not appear to lirait a 
plaintiff's claim to only equal pay for equal work. 
The Civil Rights Act's scope was limited somewhat by 
the passage of the Bennett Amendment. The Bennett 
Amendment was an attempt to reconcile the Civil Rights Act 
and Equal Pay Act as the original draft of the Civil Rights 
Act had not included sex as a protected class (Lorber & 
Kirk, 1983). The Bennett Amendment allows employers to pay 
men and women differently provided the differential wages 
do not violate the Equal Pay Act. The interpretation of 
this Amendment has been the basis for several court tests 
of comparable worth. Most of those test cases have been 
lost by the comparable worth advocates. Prior to Gunther 
V .  County of Washington, the courts had interpreted the 
Bennett Amendment to limit the Civil Rights Act to cases of 
equal pay for equal jobs. The Gunther case provided the 
first interpretation favorable to the comparable worth 
concept. In Gunther, four jail matrons sued the county 
because they were being paid at a rate of 70 percent of the 
predominantly male job classification, jail guards, even 
though a market study had recommended that jail matrons be 
paid at 95 percent of the jail guard's wage. Although the 
court specifically denied that the case was a test of 
comparable worth, the decision did crack the door for other 
comparable worth cases based on -the Bennett Amendment. In 
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another case often cited with reference to comparable 
worth, AFSCME v. State of Washington, a district court 
judge ruled that women holding state jobs that had been 
underpaid relative to predominantly male jobs should be 
given immediate wage adjustments. 
It should be noted that generally the courts have not 
viewed comparable worth as a viable, legal argument of sex 
discrimination (see Williams, 1984, for synopses of court 
cases not supporting comparable worth), preferring to rule 
by the more narrowly defined equal pay for equal work 
doctrine. In fact, 'Williams (1984) argues that the Gunther 
and Washington State cases have not been tests of 
comparable worth, but rather cases in which the employers 
had known from relevant data that they were underpaying 
some positions, but chose not to correct the underpayment. 
Holby (1984) further argues that the employers' most 
serious error was in doing the studies! 
Is, then, lack of comparable worth wage 
discrimination? Thus far, the courts have been reluctant 
to rule that lack of comparable worth is wage 
discrimination against women. Plaintiffs using the lack of 
comparable worth argument have not been successful, and at 
least one author has recommended against using the term in 
law suits (Blumrosen, cited in Lorber & Kirk, 1983), 
stating that it was "losing language". And, several 
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authors have suggested that for coiaparable vorth to be 
effective, a nationalized job evaluation system would be 
necessary (Williams, 1984; Williams & Kessler, 1984). Some 
social scientists (Rabkin, 1984) paint gloomy societal 
pictures of American society (at least American business) 
turning against women, the very class of people for which 
comparable worth is intended to help. According to their 
scenarios, women would actually lose in the salary war 
rather than gain because they would be priced out of their 
jobs. Yet, the barrage of comparable worth studies clearly 
indicates that employers are worried that they may face law 
suits based on the lack of comparable worth concept. Grune 
(1984), in comparing the costs of implementing conparable 
worth in Washington State and in Minnesota, points out that 
it may be less costly to voluntarily implement a comparable 
worth system than to be sued for alleged wage 
discrimination. Others disagree (Williams, 1984), but it 
would appear that although the courts have not explicitly 
defined comparable worth as a remedy for wage 
discrimination, many employers are reacting as though it 
were (Fulghum, 1983). 
Differential Pav for Men and Women 
As stated earlier, these current comparable worth 
discussions emerged primarily because of the differential 
earnings of women and men. In the United States, since the 
turn of the century, the earnings of women have hovered at 
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about 60 percent of the earnings of nen. Go Id in (19 8 4) 
presents wage ratios from the 1800s to the current decade 
for a variety of occupational groups. Depending on the 
year, geographical region, and the occupation, the ratio of 
wonen to men's wages has ranged froa .267 (professions, 
1890) to .710 (professions, 1970). Many researchers have 
conducted analyses of this male—female earnings gap in the 
effort to determine the cause of the differential (Lloyd & 
Neimi, 1979). These researchers' work will be described 
here. Several authors have investigated the possibility 
that the salary differentials do not reflect unfair 
discrimination but real and justifiable differences in 
factors which relate to the productivity of men and women. 
GoId in (1984), for example, attributes much of the change 
in wage differentials to be the result of four factors: 
gender specific skills, life-cycle labor force experience, 
educational attainment, and work expectations. Hers and 
other investigations have been able to account for a 
portion of the difference in male and female wages on the 
basis of such personal characteristics as education, labor 
force experience, and labor force commitment (cf., Treiman 
& Hartmann, 1981; Oaxaca, 1973; Sawhill, 1973; Mincer & 
Polachek, 1974). One of these studies (Corcoran & Duncan, 
1979) will be briefly described to demonstrate the approach 
these studies have taken. Corcoran and Duncan measured 
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educational attainment, work history (including on-the-job 
training, job tenure, and proportion of total working 
years), and labor force attachment (including hours of work 
missed due to illness of self or family, and limits on job 
hours) from a national sample of household heads and 
spouses in the labor force in 1975. According to their 
analysis, 44 percent of the difference in mean earnings of 
men and women could be attributed to differences in work 
history, labor force attachment, and education, with the 
majority of variance accounted for by work history (39 
percent). Women had less overall work experience, and less 
on-the-job training. Labor force attachment accounted for 
very little variance (3 percent). Historically, as women 
have been more likely than men to be responsible for 
chiId care and family needs, women's commitment to their 
away-from-home jobs has been perceived by employers to be 
less than men's commitment to work. Research evidence for 
such differential work commitment by sex indicates that the 
difference, if it exists (see Fry & Greenfeld, 1980), is 
probably small (Graddick & Farr, 1983) or moderated by 
other variables such as position in the organizational 
hierarchy (Bruning & Snyder, 1983) or time in occupation 
(Gomez-Mejia, 1983). Common explanations for women's less 
work experience may also relate to women's family 
obligations, although discriminatory factors may also be 
operating. For example, women may receive less on-the-job 
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training because employers perceive then to be temporary 
workers (Duncan & Hoffman, 1978). Women themselves may opt 
not to take training opportunities because they may expect 
their return on such an investment would be limited by 
perceived discrimination in the market. 
Statistical analyses have indicated that a portion of 
the discrepancy in the salaries of men and women can be 
attributed to worker characteristics. The amount of 
variance that can be accounted for by worker 
characteristics has ranged widely. (in Treiman & Hartmann 
(1981), the researchers of the studies cited found variance 
estimates of zero percent to 44 percent.) Host researchers 
find that a significant amount of the variance remains 
unexplained. Polachek (1984), however, disagrees with this 
assessment. He believes that 50 percent of the differences 
in male and female salaries can be explained by crude 
measurements of lifetime labor force participation, and 
that all the wage gap could be explained by sophisticated 
specifications of labor force participation. Polachek 
broadly defines labor force participation to include such 
variables as job choice and expectations, factors which 
others might consider functions of occupational 
segregation. Another category of research which attempts 
to explain this variance has examined the extent of 
occupational segregation by sex and the impact of 
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occupational segregation on the earnings of men and women. 
Occupât iona1 Segregat ion 
Men and women tend to hold different types of jobs. 
Women are more likely than men to work in clerical and 
service occupations and men are more likely to work in 
craft, laboring, and managerial occupations (Rytina, 1982). 
Women not only do different work than men, but their work 
is paid less; the more an occupation is dominated by 
women, the less it pays (Sommers, 1974; Bel1er, 1984). 
Hartmann, Roos, and Treiman (1980; cited in Treiman & 
Hartmann, 1981) used census data to investigate the 
relationship of sex composition of occupations and the 
earnings of incumbents. Using education, labor force 
experience, four measures of job requirements, and percent 
female as predictors of median earnings, Hartmann et al. 
found that percent female remained a significant predictor 
when the other factors were held constant. They concluded 
that the sex composition of occupations had a strong effect 
on incumbent's earnings, regard less of personal 
The amount of variance of the salary differential by 
sex accounted for by occupational segregation alone has 
ranged from 6 percent (Bluestone, 1970) to 40 percent 
(Oaxaca, 1973). Treiman and Hartmann (1981) noted that the 
range of variance accounted for appeared to be associated 
with the number of occupational groups included. 
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Blues tone's study classified groups into broad census 
groups; Oaxaca included 479 categories. Fuchs (1971) has 
argued that virtually all of the earnings gap could be 
accounted for by the different occupational distributions 
of men and women, if one could obtain a sufficiently 
detailed breakdown of categories. Among the studies that 
do consider occupation as a predictor variable (e.g., 
Fuchs, 1971; Treiman & Terrell, 1975), none fulfills Fuch's 
prediction, although the use of both worker characteristics 
and occupational classification does account for relatively 
large proportions of variance (e.g., Sanborn, 1964). 
Recent evidence suggests that the remaining difference 
in men's and women's wages may be attributed to sex 
segregation by firm (Ferber & Spaeth, 1983). Several 
researchers (Blau, 1975; Buckley, 1971; McNulty, 1967) have 
shown that women are more likely than men to be employed in 
low-paying firms. When earnings for men and women are 
compared within the same organizations and job 
classifications are considered, the wage gap nearly closes 
(Whitman, 1973, cited in Ferber & Spaeth, 1983). In 
addition to considering firm characteristics, Ferber and 
Spaeth (1983) chose to investigate specific work 
characteristics (rather than broad classes of jobs or 
occupations); they asked respondents questions about the 
characteristics of their jobs (e.g., scope of respondents' 
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policy making activities and control over monetary 
resources). These work characteristics were added to the 
standard regression analysis of salary, and helped to 
account for 56 percent of the difference between men's and 
women's salaries. Their paper takes an important step 
toward understanding the gap between men's and women's 
salaries and suggested that several explanations of pay 
differentials may be plausible. It cannot, however, answer 
the question of why job segregation occurs. 
Job segregation and firm segregation by sex appear to 
be important factors in explaining the difference in 
earnings by men and women, although why jobs, occupations, 
and organizations are segregated by sex and why those jobs 
are paid less remains unanswered. 
Explanations having economic and psychological bases 
have been offered to describe why occupational segregation 
occurs, and ultimately why women earn less. Briefly, this 
paper will describe several major economic theories of 
occupational segregation: "taste for discrimination" 
theory, "crowding" theory, monopsony, dual labor markets, 
statistica1—information theory, and human capital theory. 
Each purports to explain the pay differential by sex. 
Becker's (1971) neo-classical "taste" theory holds 
that employers have a "taste for discrimination" against 
females. The discriminatory preference for employing males 
may be the employers' own or may have developed from the 
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enp loyers '  nale workers or custodiers' desire not to 
associate with women. Male employees may demand an 
additional wage to compensate for working with women. 
Prior to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, employers could 
have avoided paying the premium by segregating women into 
separate occupations or by not hiring them at all. Such 
discrimination should increase employers' costs, costs that 
should, over time, favor nondiscriminatory employers. 
Ultimately, salary differentials and occupational 
segregation would disappear (Madden, 1975). Evidence 
clearly shows that salary differentials have not been 
eliminated in the 20 years since the passage of the Equal 
Pay Act in 1963 and of Title VII in 1964. teller (1984) 
presents data that suggest that Title VII and Title IX may 
have had an effect on the levels of occupational 
segregation. Despite the gradual decline in occupational 
segregation, she projects that it will take between 25 and 
100 years for the work force to become fully integrated. 
Another approach proposes that women are "crowded" 
into few occupations by systematic exclusion from male— 
dominated jobs. This systematic exclusion may take the 
form of discriminatory job qualifications (e.g., 
prerequisite training which only male applicants have had), 
protective legislation (e.g., no night shift work for 
women), or self—selection by women out of various jobs 
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because of social tradition (e.g., engineers, clergy) 
(Bergnann, 1971). As a result of such crowding, there is a 
larger supply of female workers than available jobs, and 
employers can offer low wages to obtain qualified female 
applicants. As in Becker's model, one would expect that 
discrimination would disappear over time because employers 
hiring women would initially have a competitive advantage. 
A monopsony exists when there is only one employer who 
has market power over male and female labor. For sex 
discrimination to exist under the monopsony model, the 
assumption that the female labor supply is less responsive 
to wage changes must also hold. There is evidence to 
support this assumption (Madden, 1975), and women have been 
willing to work for less pay than men. Hence, the 
monopsonist may find it profitable to pay women less than 
men. There has not been convincing evidence that pure 
monopsony exists. Bunting (1962, 1966) examined firm 
concentrations and did not find that any one firm was able 
to dominate a local labor market. Madden (1975) argues 
that a monopsony need not be one employer but may exist as 
the result of the collusion of major employers (i.e., a 
sort of "gentlemen's agreement"). 
Another explanation is that women's wages are 
depressed relative to men's because women and men compete 
in different labor markets. Men are more likely to compete 
with each other in a closed, or internal labor market; that 
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is, men are hired and promoted from within organizations 
for priaary jobs, jobs that have relatively long career 
ladders and extensive on-the-job training. Women, on the 
other hand, are more likely than men to compete outside the 
internal labor market for primarily entry-level jobs 
(secondary jobs), jobs that have limited career paths. 
Wages within the internal labor market (i.e., a firm) are 
higher than entry-level jobs. The firm wishes to retain 
those employees in whom it has made investments. Further, 
because the demand for labor comes from within the firm for 
the firm's labor supply of mostly males, it may be expected 
that wages would increase for men and not for women 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971, cited in Gold, 1983). There is 
evidence that there are two separate, sex-stratified labor 
markets, and that earnings are less in the secondary sector 
(Edwards, 1979, cited in Treiman & Hartmann, 1981). 
Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1971, cited in Madden, 1973) 
independently developed a statist ical—informat ion 
discrimination explanation. Employers wish to minimize 
training and turnover costs by hiring the most productive 
workers; because women are perceived by employers to be 
high risk employees for jobs requiring expensive training, 
they are not hired. The theory assumes that if employers 
were to hire women, they would 1 earn differently, but 
because women are never hired for other than entry level 
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jobs (which because of the type of work, tend to have high 
rates of turnover), the enployers never gain such 
information about women as workers. Wonen are thus hired 
only for jobs in which the costs of turnover and training 
are minimal. Again, employers who do not hold such 
discriminatory beliefs would be expected to be at a 
competitive advantage, and ultimately one would expect such 
discrimination to disappear. 
Human capital theory and sex role socialization share 
common elements in their approaches to explaining 
occupational segregation (England, 1984). Because of sex 
role tradition or expectations, boys and girls select 
different courses in school and acquire different kinds of 
knowledge and skills (human capital) which are 
differentially valued by the labor market. Girls are more 
likely to make an investment in homemaking skills, skills 
which do not command high rates of pay in the labor market. 
As a result, women are confined to jobs which require 
relatively little skill (and hence low pay), and which are 
relatively easy to enter and exit. Men, on the other hand, 
have obtained or cultivated more marketable skills and can 
choose from among a wide range of jobs. These cycles can 
perpetuate as girls and boys growing up observe their 
mothers who are homemakers and if working mothers, in low-
paying jobs: girls and boys form stereotyped perceptions of 
men's and women's work, and subsequently, differing 
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expectations for their abilities and attainments in work 
associated with men or with women (Garland & Smith, 1981; 
Gold, 1983 ; Hartley, I960 ; Sens ley & Borges, 1981; Loo f t, 
1971; Mueller, 1982; Vogel, Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, 
& Rosenkrantz, 1970). 
Regardless of the theory to which one subscribes, 
occupational segregation occurs and is believed by many to 
be a significant factor in the difference between men's and 
women's wages. After reviewing the relevant literature on 
the difference in men's and women' wages, there would 
appear to be two major and significantly different 
approaches to diminish the wage gap: 1) Women could enter 
those jobs for which they have been previously been 
underqualified, For this to occur, there would need to be: 
most importantly, a change in the process of socialization 
and acquisition of human capital by women and men; better 
understanding and more accurate perceptions by employers of 
women's worth on the job; and less discrimination which 
discourages women from entering the market place. If these 
changes were to occur, occupational segregation would 
eventually be eliminated. 2) Change the evaluation of the 
worth of jobs in which men and women tend to predominate; 
specifically, assign more value to occupations in which 
women work. Because occupational segregation has declined 
slowly in the past 40 years that segregation has been 
indexed (Seller, 1984; Treiman & Terre 1 , 1975), the latter 
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indexed (Bélier, 1984; Treiman & Terrell, 1975), the latter 
option, that of comparable worth, has been favored by many 
concerned with the persistent wage gap of men and women and 
who do not want to wait for the demise of occupational 
segregat ion. 
Although no one definition of comparable worth has 
been accepted (Remich, 1981), comparable worth will be 
defined here as equal pay for jobs evaluated to be of equal 
worth to the employer. The worth of a job is determined by 
assessing the skills, effort, knowledge, and responsibility 
necessary to successfully complete the tasks required of a 
job. If comparable worth is accepted as a means to 
eliminate wage discrimination, some means must be used to 
determine the value of job factors. Job evaluation is the 
technique which is used to do so. 
Job Evaluat ion 
The process of job evaluation appears to be at the 
center of the comparable worth controversy (Bellack, Bates, 
& Glasner, 1983; Eyde, 1983; Fredlund, 1983; Hartmann & 
Treiman, 1983; Jeanneret, 1980; Pierson, Koziara, & 
Johannes son, 1983; Thompson, 1981). Several such 
approaches exist to measure the content and requirements of 
a position and ultimately its dollar worth to the employer. 
Those techniques which are most commonly linked to 
comparable worth issues are the benchmark or market pricing 
plan, and factor comparison or point plans. Briefly, these 
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quantitative job evaluation approaches ir.ay be described as 
follows (Belcher, 1974); In both techniques, compensable 
factors common to all jobs within the organization are 
selected. Common compensable factors may include 
educational requirements, responsibility, physical 
requirements, and working conditions. The organization 
assigns values to the compensable factors (rankings, 
weightings, or points). 
In the market pricing approach, these values for 
selected benchmark or key positions (a subset of all 
relevant jobs within the organization) are compared to 
salaries assigned by other organizations for same or 
similar positions. Several authors (Grune, 1984; Treiman & 
Hartmann, 1981) have argued that this approach serves to 
continue sex discrimination because salaries determined by 
the market are not bias-free. Others defend the market 
approach (McCormick, 1981; Schwab, 1980) stating that the 
primary goal of job evaluation is to maximize the 
relationship of prevailing job rates to the firm's 
hierarchy of positions. These authors tend to view the 
labor market as a reasonable arbitrator of the cost of 
labor. 
In contrast, the factor comparison or point method 
usually does not consider market rates, but rather assigns 
monetary values for points or factors based on what may be 
deemed internally equitable. Although job evaluation 
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deemed internally equitable. Although job evaluation 
appears to be objective because numerical values are 
assigned, the process does require that several subjective 
decisions be.made. For example, not all persons would 
agree to the compensable factors chosen, the values 
assigned to those factors, the key positions selected for 
comparison, or the validity of market rates as criteria 
(Neuse, 1982). Remarkably little research has assessed how 
these kinds of judgments have been made. 
Early studies of the reliability with which evaluators 
assigned values to compensable factors were done in the 
1940s. Reported reliabilities were within acceptable 
ranges (.77 to .98) (Ash, 1948; Chesler, 1948; Jones, 1948; 
Lawshe & Wilson, 1947), and such research was largely 
abandoned after World War II with the dismantling of the 
National War Labor Board. Interest in the reliability of 
job evaluation has been rekindled with the renewed interest 
of the measurement of job worth within the comparable worth 
controversy. Doverspike, Carlisi, Barrett, & Alexander 
(1983) conducted a reliability analysis of a point-method 
job evaluation approach of 20 jobs. They found high levels 
of reliability (.90s) across 10 raters of whom 5 were 
female and 5 were male. Doverspike et al. interpreted 
their results as demonstrating the high reliability with 
which raters can evaluate jobs, regardless of personal 
characteristics of the raters. Their research did not. 
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however, consider the possibility that men and wocien may 
hold the same stereotyped views of jobs in which there are 
predominantly women or predominantly men. High reliability 
is not sufficient to demonstrate validity. 
Several kinds of biases (and measurement errors) may 
taint the accuracy of organizational decisions. Biases and 
errors have been noted in the literature regarding employee 
selection, promotions, job analyses, and performance 
evaluations. Research has indicated that women and men may 
be differentially selected and promoted because of 
employers' beliefs regarding differential work commitment, 
competency, and sex-role appropriateness (Arvey, 1979; 
Nieva & Gutek, 1980; Taylor & Ilgen, 1981). There has been 
some evidence that job analysts' decisions may be 
influenced by the level of the job within the 
organizational hierarchy, degree of familiarity with the 
job content (Madden, 1960, 1961; cited in Guion, 1981), 
degree of incumbent's enthusiasm for his or her job (Arvey, 
Davis, McGowen, & Dipboye, 1982) and sex of incumbents 
(Arvey, Passino, & Lounsbury, 1977). Performance appraisal 
decisions have been found to be related to the form of 
rater training and purpose of the ratings (Zedeck & Cascio, 
1982). 
Conceivably, biases which have affected the accuracy 
of the aforementioned organizational decisions may also 
function in the assessment of job worth via job evaluation. 
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function in the assessment of job worth via job evaluation. 
The problems of potential biases of job evaluation must be 
considered carefully if job evaluation is to be used as the 
measuring tool for comparable worth. 
Attempts to Determine Comparab1e Worth 
The most frequent method used by consultants to 
measure comparable worth is the multiple regression 
approach (e.g., Arthur Young and Co., 1984; Willis, 1974, 
1976). Jobs that are held predominantly by males are 
selected as the benchmark group. Multiple regression 
analyses are done using the compensable factors as the 
independent variables and salary as the dependent variable. 
Regression weights are thus derived for the male-dominated 
jobs. The multiple regression equation obtained with the 
male-dominated jobs is used to predict salaries for jobs 
held predominantly by females. Overprediction or 
underprediction of the salaries of the female-dominated 
positions is considered evidence for salary discrimination 
and lack of comparable worth. 
Another common approach is to do multiple regression 
analyses for the predominantly female jobs, and compare 
these weights to the regression weights derived from the 
male sample. Differences in the regression weights 
provides evidence for discrimination. 
The author has no quarrel with the multiple regression 
approach per se. It has been well-received by the courts 
as a method" capable of detecting salary bias (Birnbaum, 
1979; Bloom & Ki11ingswortb, 1982; Finkelstein, 1980; 
Fisher, 1980; Gray & Scott, 1980; Ramsay, 1979; Risher & 
Cameron, 1981). The author argues against the usual use of 
multiple regression analysis that uses predominantly male 
jobs as the benchmark group for the assessment of 
comparable worth because it assumes that the job components 
of the predominantly male jobs are correctly calibrated 
vis-a—vis market salaries . This author argues that a 
better benchmark group is one composed of jobs in which 
neither sex predominates. Regression weights derived from 
this benchmark group would seem to approximate market value 
with relatively little sex bias. This assumption is an 
important one for the current research. Of primary 
interest was the use of this "neutral or mixed" sex group 
of jobs as a benchmark in comparing the worth of jobs. 
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METHOD 
As previously implied, the major purpose of this 
research was to investigate a different method than 
previously used to compare the worth of jobs within a 
professional and scientific job classification system. The 
research plan was to select jobs and to analyze those jobs 
for comparable worth, using the sex-neutral group of jobs 
as a benchmark or baseline group. Through the use of this 
approach, one also attempts to determine whether the sex 
compositions of jobs affect the valuations of those jobs. 
In 1975, Iowa State University developed a system of 
job evaluation and wage compensation for its classification 
of employees known as professional and scientific. The 
professional and scientific classification system includes 
such diverse functional areas as laboratory researchers, 
extension educators, and administrative supervisors. The 
procedure used to determine job worth combined both 
benchmark and factor comparison job evaluative approaches 
(Booz, Allen, & Hamilton, 1976). Points assigned to 
compensable factors were regressed against market salaries 
for benchmark positions to determine the weightings of the 
factors. As a result, points assigned to compensable 
factors are translated into salary ranges. Total summed 
point values range from 1000 to over 4500 and place a 
position within a certain grade level. Grade levels have 
point count spreads of 500 points (e.g., 1500 to 2000 is 
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the point count range for Grade level 2). The compensable 
factors used at Iowa State University are listed and 
defined in Table 1. Since the inception of the 
compensation policy, concern has been expressed about the 
equity of the system. In particular, questions have been 
raised about the appropriateness of the weights of the 
compensable factors. Some of those questions about weights 
will be addressed by this research. 
Research Ques t ions 
The specific questions to be answered by the proposed 
research were these: 
1. Within the professional and scientific 
classification sys tem, are posit ions which have equal point 
counts paid the same salary, whether held predominantly by 
men or predominantly by women? If women and men holding 
positions having the same point count are paid differently, 
there would be clear evidence for wage discrimination. 
This question can be answered using a traditional approach 
(e.g., multiple regression). 
2. Are compensable factors weighted differently for 
positions held predominantly by men or predominantly by 
women? Similar pay for equal point counts does not 
necessarily mean that the job components are weighted 
similarly for positions held predominantly by males or by 
females. The regression equations from the positions held 
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T a b l e  1  
Conpensable factors of professional and scientific positions 
at Iowa State University 
Factor 1 Complexity of Problems to be SoIved : 
This factor measures the variety, complexity, 
and the type of problems and decisions 
expected to be resolved by the incumbent. 
Factor 2 M in imum Skills and Knowledge Required ; 
This factor measures the knowledge needed by 
the incumbent in order to perform assigned 
duties or to function at the appropriate 
scholarly or professional level, regardless of 
whether the knowledge was acquired through 
education, on-the-job training, work experience, 
or other means. 
Factor 3 Interpersonal Relationships Ord inari1v InvoIved 
in the Day-to-Day Activities o f the Posit ion ; 
This factor measures the nature of the contacts, 
and the stress involved, whether merely to 
exchange factual information or whether 
persuasion and analysis is inherent or negotia­
tions are conducted. 
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T a b l e  I  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
Organizat ion Leve1s at Which Interpersonal 
Relationships Ordinarily Occur : 
This factor measures contact within and/or 
outside the University except the contacts 
normally associated with the supervisor/ 
subordinate relationship. 
Nature o f Responsibility Exerc ised. Within the 
Context of the Overa 11 Qperat ions of the 
Universitv: 
This factor is concerned with the purpose of the 
contacts ranging from the factual exchange of 
informât ion to s ituations invoIv ing s ignificant 
or controversial issues, differing viewpoints, 
goals, or objectives. 
Factor 6 Extent o f F unct iona1 Responsibility Exercised : 
This factor measures the extent of 
responsibility exercised depending on the scope 
and breadth of the area and activities within 
the area or assigned to the incumbent. 
Factor 4 
Factor 5 
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T a b l e  1  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
Constraints of Independent Act ion. Within 
Which the Pos it ion Funct ions ; 
This factor measures the nature and extent of 
direct and indirect supervisory controls and the 
availability of guidelines such as precedents, 
oral and written instructions, standard nethods, 
and procedures and manuals. 
Impac t o f Independent Act ions on the A11 a inmeat 
of Goa1s for Educat iona1 Programs and/or 
Institutional Development : 
This factor appraises the consequences of error 
in proportion to the requirements of the job. 
How serious is a mistake or an error and how 
long will it take to correct? Might the 
department suffer embarrassment, financial loss, 
time or injury to good will? 
Factor 7 
Factor 8 
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predominantly by aales and by females will be compared to a 
regression equation derived from the group of positions 
that have proportions of approximately 50 percent male and 
50 percent female job incumbents. 
3. Do variables other than the compensable factors 
account for variance in the prediction of salaries? 
Although the system has been designed to relate wages 
directly to point counts of compensable factors, it may be 
that other variables such as the tenure at Iowa State 
University of job incumbents can predict the salaries of 
professional and scientific positions. 
Pro c edu re and S amp 1e 
As the primary purposeof this research was to 
demonstrate a method of determining comparable worth, jobs 
in which the proportions of men and women were 
approximately equal were selected as benchmarks from the 
among the 1272 positions within the professional and 
scientific classification (See Table 16 in the Appendix). 
Because of the approximately equal number of men and women 
within these jobs, the value of these jobs' compensable 
factors was believed not be to related to the sex of job 
incumbent. Or, if the value is related, these job 
components should not be weighted particularly in favor of 
either males or females. The compensable factors for these 
jobs will be considered to be relatively free of sex bias. 
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To determine the weights of the compensable factors, the 
point values for the compensable factors of the benchmark 
jobs were entered as predictors of salary. Because 
salaries are often negatively skewed, the natural 
logarithmic transformation of raw salary was used as a 
dependent variable. (Separate regression analyses were 
done with raw salary as a dependent variable as well.) 
Multiple regression analyses were also done using the 
summed compensable factor point values as the criterion 
(dependent variable). As salaries may be distorted by 
market place values, it was believed that summed point 
counts may have been less biased by external constraints, 
and may have provided a finer analysis of job worth. One 
would expect that changes in the point counts during the 
history of the system would be due more to internal factors 
(i.e., internal equity considerations) than as the result 
of market fluctuations. 
Jobs not having equivalent numbers of men and women 
were also selected. These jobs were categorized according 
to their approximate proportion of male and female job 
incumbents and the following groups were identified: 
Twenty—seven female—dominated jobs (10% male—90% female), 
sixty-three male-dominated jobs (90% male-10% female), 
eleven jobs in which the approximate proportions were 25 
percent male and 75 percent female, and eighteen jobs with 
the proportion of 75 percent male and 25 percent female. 
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(See Tables 16 , 17, 18, and 19", respectively, in the 
Appendix.) For each of these categories, multiple 
regression analyses were done as for the benchmark jobs, 
using compensable factor points as predictors of raw 
salary, logarithmic salary, and summed total point counts. 
The amount of variance accounted for (R squared) by 
each equation of the four different sex composition groups 
was compared to the R squared value of the equation from 
the benchmark job category. To determine if the beta 
weights for the compensable factors derived from the four 
sex composition categories were different fron the 
benchmark group's equation, the betas from the benchmark 
group's equation were applied to the other four equations. 
If the compensable factors are weighted without bias, one 
would hypothesize that the regression equations developed 
from the nonbenchmark groups would be similar to the 
regression equation developed from the benchmark jobs. If, 
on the other hand, there are significant differences in the 
regression weights or in the overall variance accounted 
for, bias in the compensable factors may be suspected. 
Differences in the regression weights indicate that the 
factors are being given less or more weight in one equation 
than in another. Overall variance differences suggest that 
some regression equations are differentially effective in 
predicting the dependent variable. 
3 3  
The formula to derive the relevant F statistic is 
shown in Table 2. A significant F indicates that the 
application of the benchmark beta does not adequately 
predict the other regression line. Or, in other words, the 
regression weights of an equation differ from the benchmark 
equation. Because of the interdependence among the betas, 
it was not appropriate to use a t-statistic to make 
specific comparisons; hence, it was not used in comparing 
pairs of betas (Uolins, 1984). 
Ancillary analyses to elucidate the main analyses 
included intercorrelating the compensable factors, with 
particular attention to possible problems of 
mu1tico11inearity, obtaining the mean values and standard 
deviations of the compensable factors and salaries, and a 
factor analysis of the eight compensable factors. 
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T a b l e  2  
Calculation of test statistic to compare regression lines 
to the comparison regression line (50% male — 50% female) 
2 ^2 
[ R - R 1 / k -
y.y y.y 
1 1  2 2  
2 
[1 - R ] / N - k 
y-y 
1 1  
2 
where R = multiple R of comparison regression line 
y « y  
1 1  
"2 
R = multiple R obtained when Bs of comparison 
y .y 
22 line are applied to another regress ion 1ine 
N = sample size 
k =• number of independent variables 
and 
2 
I B . r I 
1 x'y 
- 2  2  
R 
y.y B'.r . B 
2 2  1  X X  1  
2 2 
where r = vector of correlations of independent 
x'y 
2 variables with criterion 
r = matrix of intercorrelations among 
x x 
2 2 independent variables 
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RESULTS 
The siean raw salary and mean factor points of each of 
the groups are presented in Table 3. As can be seen from 
the data, the salaries of the groups with the most males 
have higher salaries. This result is similar to other 
researchers' findings. The mean point values of each of 
the factors and of the summed total point counts are also 
higher for those jobs which have a higher proportion of 
males. A MAKOVA was performed to determine if these 
differences were statistically significant; they were. 
(See Table 21 in the Appendix.) In and of themselves, 
these results do not deter further analyses as the major 
interest is in the regression weights attached to the 
different factors for the different sex-composition groups. 
Within each of the grades the skewness of the variable 
raw salary was assessed. Salary was not negatively skewed 
as had been expected. In fact, the salaries were 
positively skewed in all but Grades 6 and 8, which salary 
distributions were slightly negatively skewed. On the 
advice of a statistician and an econometrician, the 
logarithmic transformation was still applied. Both raw 
salary and the transformed salary variable were used in 
additional analyses. 
Before running the regression analyses, 
intercorrelations of the eight factors within each sex-
composition group were calculated to determine the 
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T a b l e  3  
Characteristics or each of the selected groups 
90% Male-10% Female 
75% Male-25% Female 
Var iable Mean S .D. 
Salary ( raw) 27970.70 6054 .96 
Total po int s 2434.91 537 .33 
Factor 1 370 .19 84 .91 
Factor 2 484.72 133 .43 
Factor 3 385.49 95 .41 
Factor 4 391.16 131 .98 
Factor 5 355.16 7 0 .01 
Factor 6 298.35 71 .34 
Factor 7 86.77 21 .24 
Factor 8 63 .09 20 .34 
Var iable Mean S .D . 
Salary ( raw) 25364.70 8656 .01 
Total ] po int s 2193 .84 496 .AO 
Factor 1 324.62 84 .54 
Factor 2 440.19 115 .60 
Factor 3 390.36 102 .95 
Factor 4 331.80 122 .97 
Factor 5 322 .96 63 .40 
Factor 6 249.68 59 .99 
Factor 7 82.19 20 .21 
Factor 3 52 .03 13 .33 
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T a b l e  3  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
50% Male —50% Fenale Var iab1e Mean S.D. 
Salary (raw) 21867.87 5558 .10 
Total po int s 2052.76 462 .55 
Factor 1 293.04 73 .07 
Factor 2 404.61 102 .09 
Factor 3 350.11 93 .77 
Factor 4 310.89 137 .29 
Factor 5 320.99 52 .33 
Factor 6 240.20 72 .92 
Factor 7 79.12 20 .16 
Factor 8 5 3.80 20 .08 
25% Male-75% Feraale: Variable Mean S VP. 
Salary ( raw) 19725 .63 3734 .31 
Total points 1813 .39 445 .31 
Factor 1 259 .50 82 .63 
Factor 2 372 .01 107 .27 
Factor 3 329 .59 60 .59 
Factor 4 263 .83 74 .99 
Factor 5 288 .73 69 .31 
Factor 6 181 .89 93 .44 
Factor 7 71 .50 18 .82 
Factor 8 46 .34 18 .34 
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T a b l e  3  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
10% Male —90% Fenale: Var iable Mean S.D. 
Salary (raw) 19334 .51 3360 .70 
Total points 1672 . 94 301 .77 
Factor 1 225 .58 5 1 .69 
Factor 2 357 .97 75 .27 
Factor 3 321 .93 75 .53 
Factor 4 265 .85 77 .96 
Factor 5 255 .82 41 .37 
Factor 6 146 .13 60 .66 
Factor 7 61 .39 15 .94 
Factor 8 38 .28 11 .59 
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seriousness of nu 11ico11inearity anong the factors. Also, 
the eight factors were correlated with the three dependent 
variables; raw salary, log salary, and total point count. 
These intercorrelations and first order correlations are 
presented in Table 4 for the benchmark Cor comparison) 
group (50% male-50% female); Table 5 for the 10% niale-90% 
female group; Table 6 for 90% male-10% female group; Table 
7 for 7 5% male-2 5% female group; and Table S for 25% male— 
75% female group. In general, the correlations among the 
factors is higher than the author had anticipated, 
suggesting serious mu1tico11inearity. The average 
intercorrelation is .539. Among the correlations in the 
benchmark group (Table 4), Compensable Factor Six, "Extent 
of functional responsibility exercised" is the most 
independent factor, correlating at a (relatively) low level 
with Compensable Factor Seven, "Constraints of independent 
action". Compensable Factor Eight, "Impact of independent 
actions on the attainment of institutional goals". 
Compensable Factor Two, "Minimum skills and knowledge 
neededCompensable Factor Three, "Interpersonal 
relationships of day-to-day activities", and Compensable 
Factor Four, "Organizational level at which interpersonal 
relationships ordinarily occur". Similar correlations for 
Compensable Factor Six with those factors are found for the 
female—dominated group and the 75% male—25% female 
group. For the 25% male-75% female group, and the 90% 
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aale —10 % fenale group. Compensable Factor Six does not have 
the sane pattern of low correlations. Another pattern that 
appears across several groups is the low correlation of 
Compensable Factors Three "Interpersonal relationships of 
day-to-day activities" and Five, "Nature of responsibility 
exercised" (in the 25% male-75% female and 10% male-90% 
female groups). 
The first order correlations of the factors with the 
criterion variables also varied from group to group. The 
average factor-criteria correlations for the 50% ma 1e-50% 
female group were .793 for total point count, .685 for raw 
salary, and . 662 for log salary. For the 90% ma 1e-10% 
female group, correlat ions c f the ind iv idua1 f acto r s wi th 
the criterion raw salary average .721, log salary .707, 
and .840 with total point count. In contrast, in the 
female-dominated group, the average correlation of the 
compensable factors with criteria for raw salary is .477, 
for log salary, .467, and .701 for the total point count, 
owing much to the low correlations of Compensable Factor 
Six with these criteria. These correlations indicate that 
more variance can be explained in the criteria of male-
dominated jobs than in the female-dominated jobs. Of all 
the groups, the correlations based on the 90% male-10% 
female group were most similar to the benchmark group's 
(50% nale-50% female) correlations. 
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T a b l e  4  
Intercorrelations of position factors and correlations of 
the factors with total point count, salary, and log salary 
for the 50% male - 50% female group (n=99) 
Factor 1 2345678 
2 .697 
3 .528 .587 
4 .708 .761 .763 
5 .787 .639 .431 .625 
6 .603 .268 .302 .279 .515 
7 .642 .785 .493 .656 .614 .291 
8  . 6 3 7 . 7 1 1  . 7 2 1  . 8 4 9  . 5 4 8 . 2 9 5 . 6 7 4  
Total 
Point 
Count .869 .855 .791 .912 .783 .540 .758 .837 
Salary .759 .673 .733 .832 .661 .511 .603 .708 
Log 
Salary .759 .672 .703 .787 .627 .487 .596 .669 
N o t e :  A l l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  . 0 5  l e v e l .  
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T a b l e  5  
Intercorrelations o£ position factors and correlations of 
the factors with total point count, salary, and log salary 
for the 10% male - 90% female group (n=156) 
Factor 
1 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
. 507 — — — 
3 .403 .587 — — — 
4 .421 .598 .400 — — — 
5 .747 .404 .165* .469 — 
6 .702 .316 .225 .013 .402 
7 .478 .394 .671 .420 .439 .290 — 
8 .372 .549 .657 .382 .336 .327 .48 2 
Tot a 1 
Po int 
Count .825 .817 .713 .699 .671 .567 .666 -653 
Salary .513 .588 .528 .633 .513 .113* .558 .366 
Log 
Salary .503 .561 .525 .619 .497 .109* .568 .355 
Note: All coefficients, except those marked with an * 
are significant at the .05 level. 
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T a b l e  6  
Intercorrelations of position factors and correlations of 
the factors with total point count, salary, and log salary 
for the 90% male - 10% female group (n=365) 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
2 .787 
3 .471 .503 — — — 
4 .756 .746 .738 — — — 
5 .830 .732 .551 .785 — — — 
6 .732 .559 .586 .662 .672 — — — 
7 .817 .715 .514 .750 .774 .674 — — — 
8 .696 .535 .611 .699 .621 .790 .6 84 
Tot al 
Po int 
Count .888 .864 .752 .928 .878 .799 .339 .774 
Salary .772 .738 .599 .806 .766 .706 .709 .674 
Log 
Salary .751 .740 .592 .801 .757 .680 .680 .651 
N o t e :  A l l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  . 0 5  l e v e l .  
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T a b l e  7  
Irvtercorrelations of position factors and correlations of 
the factors with total point count, salary, and log salary 
for the 75% male - 25% female group (n=180) 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 S 
1 
2 .747 — — — 
3 .634 .791 — — — 
4 .675 .659 .749 — — — 
5 .864 .630 .571 .672 — 
6 .569 .492 .413 .451 .496 
7 .799 .828 .719 .719 .751 .569 
8 .506 .377 .438 .622 .519 .573 .567 — 
Total 
Po int 
Count .882 .881 .859 .871 .826 .642 .890 .620 
Salary .870 .748 .621 .636 .827 .380 .781 . 467 
Log 
Salary .857 .779 .707 .732 .822 .445 .814 .569 
N o t e :  A l l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  . 0 5  l e v e l .  
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T a b l e  8  
Intercorrelations of position factors and correlations of 
the factors with total point count, salary, and log salary 
for the 25% male - 75% fenale group (n=70) 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
2 .768 — — — 
3 .468 .507 — — — 
4 .663 .433 .480 — — — 
5 .805 .804 .279 .657 
6 .862 .779 .327 .578 .893 — 
7 .675 .680 .674 .672 .730 .741 
8 .658 .697 .424 .631 .775 .701 .786 — 
Total 
Po int 
Count .916 .881 .602 .748 .903 .904 .850 .803 
Salary .728 .812 .582 .414 .614 .663 .547 .398 
Log 
Salary .742 .803 .562 .425 .629 .691 .549 .412 
N o t e :  A l l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  . 0 5  l e v e l .  
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Regression analysis (simultaneous solution witli forced 
entry of all eight factors) was applied to each of the sex-
composition groups, using the eight factors as independent 
variables and raw salary, log salary, and total (summed) 
point count each as dependent variables. The resulting R 
squared values are shown in Table 9. 
Using the total point count as the dependent variable, 
the eight factors were capable of perfect prediction in 
three of the five groups. The system thus is internally 
consistent. In the remaining two groups, the compensable 
factor "Complexity of problems to be solved". Compensable 
Factor One, did not enter even though the tolerance level 
was lowered for its possible entry. There was too little 
variance left unaccounted for, for Compensable Factor One 
to enter. This would appear to be primarily a consequence 
of Compensable Factor One's high first order correlation 
with the criteria and the other compensable factors. 
For the criterion of raw salary, over 80 percent of 
the variance of raw salary is accounted for by the 
compensable factors for the 50% male-50% female, 75% male-
25% female, 25% male—73% female groups. For those groups 
that are not heavily dominated by males or by females, raw 
salary is well-predicted by the compensable factors. The 
amount of accountable variance is somewhat less for the 
predominantly male group; about 75 percent of the salary 
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variance for the male-dominated group is explained by 
the combined compensable factors. In contrast to those 
groups, just over 60 percent of the variance in raw salary 
is attributable to the compensable factors for the 
predominantly female group of jobs. Apparently, some 
other, unaccountable factors are operating to suppress the 
predictability of raw salaries for the feraale-dominated 
group. These results strongly suggest that there is not as 
strong a relationship between salary and factor point count 
for this group of jobs as for the other groups. 
Finally, the R squared values for the regression using 
log salary as the criterion are also presented in Table 9. 
V'Jith the exception of the 75% male-25% female group, the R. 
squared values for the criterion log salary are somewhat 
smaller than the values for the criterion raw salary. 
The standardized regression coefficients for all five 
groups using total point count as the criterion are 
displayed in Table 10. All factors entered into the 
equations had regression coefficients that were 
significantly different from zero. Upon examination of 
these regression weights, several patterns emerge. 
Compensable Factor Seven, "Constraints of independent 
action", and Eight, "Impact of independent actions on 
attainment of institutional goals" did not weigh very 
heavily in any of the regressions. For all the groups. 
Compensable Factor Two, "Minimum skills and knowledge 
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Table 9 
2 
R for each of the regression lines 
Group 
90%M-10%F 
7 5%H-25%F 
50%M-50%F 
25%M-75%F 
10%M-90%F 
Criterion 
Log Salary Raw Salary 
.7 29*** 
.849*** 
.746*** 
. 8 0 1 * * *  
.594*** 
.746*** 
.83 9*** 
.820*** 
.816*** 
.614*** 
Total 
Point Count 
a 
.996*** 
a 
.995*** 
1  . 0 0 0  
1  . 0 0 0  
1  . 0 0 0  
a 
Does not include Compensable Factor One which did not 
enter at the s aiae to 1er an ce level as it did in t he o t her 
regression lines. 
***p <.001. 
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T a b l e  1 0  
Regression coefficients (standardized) for the 5 groups 
using total point count as criterion 
Group 
Fac- 90%M-10%F 75%M-25%F 50%M-50%F 25%M-75%F 10%H-90%F 
tor 
a a 
1 .1580 .1703 .1579** .1856** .2044** 
2 .2926** .2774** .2207** .2409** .249 4** 
3 .1468** .2014** .2027** . 1540** .2505** 
4 .2599** .2528** .2968** .1684** .2584** 
5 .1768** .2364** .1131** .1556** .13 71** 
6 .1648** .1387** .1576** .2098** .2010** 
7 .0717** .0577** .043 6** .0423** .0561** 
8 .0575** .0348** .0434** .0412** .0384** 
a 
Compensable Factor One did not enter in these 
regressions. 
*p <.05. 
* * p  < . 0 1 .  
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required" was a relatively important variable. With the 
exception of the 25% male-75% female group. Compensable 
Factor Four, "Organizational level at which interpersonal 
relationships ordinarily occur" is nearly as heavily 
weighted as Compensable Factor Two, "Minimum skills and 
knowledge required." By visually comparing the four sex-
cociposition groups to the benchmark group, one notes that 
Compensable Factor Six, "Nature of responsibility 
exercised" is weighted more heavily in the female job 
groups than in the 50% male-50% female groups (or the two 
•nale-doninated job groupings). One can also see that 
Compensable Factor Three, "Interpersonal relationships of 
day-to-day activities" is more heavily weighted in the 10% 
male—90% female group and less heavily weighted in the 90% 
male-10% female group than in the benchmark group.' 
Table 11 presents the betas for the five groups when 
raw salary was used as the criterion. Using the F ratio 
found in Table 2, all regression lines were significantly 
different from the benchmark group's regression equation. 
First, each group's regression coefficients will be 
described, and then comparisons to the benchmark group will 
be made. 
For the benchmark (50% male—50% female) group. 
Compensable Factor Four, "Organizational levels at which 
interpersonal relationships ordinarily occur". Compensable 
Factoi One, "Complexity of problems to be solved". 
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T a b l e  1 1  
Regression coefficients (standardized) for the 5 groups 
using raw salary as criterion 
Group 
Fac- 90%M-10%F 75%H-25%F 50%H-50%F 25%H-75%F 10%M-90%F 
tor 
1 .1032 .4998*** .3410** .1819 .2289 
2 . 1 9 54*** .2638*** - .0406 .7181*** .2363** 
3 .0004 -.0328 .2343** .2986* .1961 
4 .3375*** .0737 .5129*** .0806 .2027** 
5 .14 90** .2850** - .0007 .0323 .1796 
6 .1854*** -.25 3 6*** .1516* .1810 -.2564** 
7 -.0458 . 1060 .0256 -.1150 .1942* 
8 .0517 .1122 -.1252 - .4609*** -.1249 
*p <.05. 
**p <.01. 
***p <.001. 
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Compensable Factor Three, "Interpersonal relationships of 
day-to-day activities", and Compensable Factor Six, "Extent 
of functional responsibility exercised" are significantly 
weighted in predicting raw salary. This sample of jobs is 
paid according to the interpersonal characteristics 
required by the job, the complexity of tasks to be 
performed, and the amount of functional responsibility 
exercised. 
The predominantly male job group's significant 
regression coefficients were Compensable Factor Four, 
"Organizational levels at which interpersonal relationships 
ordinarily occur". Compensable Factor Two, "Minimum skills 
and knowledge required", Compensable Factor Six, "Extent of 
functional responsibility exercised", and Compensable 
Factor Five, "Nature of responsibility exercised". Male-
dominated jobs are paid on the basis of function and nature 
of responsibility exercised (i.e., supervision), skills and 
knowledge required brought to the job, and the level of the 
organization at which job incumbents do their jobs. 
The predominantly female job group's significant 
regression coefficients were Compensable Factor Four, 
"Organizational levels at which interpersonal relationships 
ordinarily occur", Compensable Factor Two, "Minimum skills 
and knowledge required". Compensable Factor Six, "Extent of 
functional responsibility exercised", and Compensable 
Factor Seven, "Constraints of independent action". For the 
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predominantly female group, "Organizational level at which 
interpersonal relationships and minimum skills and 
knowledge required were positively valued in determining 
salary (as in the 50% male-50% female group and 90% male-
10% female group); however, the negative relationship of 
functional responsibility exercised indicates that the more 
functional responsibility a job in this group has, the less 
money it is awarded. Hence, having responsibility for 
people and things does not bring a corresponding value in 
compensation to the job for female—dominated jobs. 
For the 75% nale-25% female group. Compensable Factor 
One, "Complexity of problems to be solved", was 
s ignif ican t, as were Compens able Facto rs F ive, "Natur e o f 
responsibility exercised". Two, "Minimum skills and 
knowledge required", and Six, "Extent of functional 
responsibility exercised". Compensable Factor Six was 
negatively weighted. For the 25% male-75% female group. 
Compensable Factor Two, "Minimum skills and knowledge 
required". Three, "Interpersonal relationships of day-to-
day activities", and Eight, "Impact of independent actions 
on attainment of institutional goals", has significant 
regression coefficients. Compensable Factor Two was the 
most heavily weighted. For this group of jobs, minimum 
skills and knowledge required are the major determinant of 
pay; curiously, the more serious an error (Compensable 
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Factor Eight)., the less one's job is rewarded in the form 
of salary. 
To summarize, all of the regression lines were 
significantly different from the benchmark regression line. 
The benchmark group is paid according to several 
dimensions: the complexity of the job, the interpersonal 
relationships involved, the organizational level at which 
the positions function, and the functional responsibility 
it has. When comparing the male—dominated positions to the 
benchmark group, one notes that two factors are significant 
in both. Both Compensable Factors, Four "Organizational 
levels at which interpersonal relationships ordinarily 
occur", and Six, "Extent of functional responsibility 
exercised", represent responsibility aspects of the 
positions. In addition to being paid for having 
responsibility, male—dominated jobs are compensated 
according to the skill and knowledge needed and the 
organizational level of functioning (as in the benchmark 
group). When one compares the female-dominated jobs to the 
benchmark positions, one sees that organizational level, 
and skills and knowledge required are significant (as in 
the male-dominated positions). Although the same factors 
yielded significant regression coefficients in the male and 
female—dominated positions, the weights are different; the 
responsibility dimension for the female-dominated positions 
is negatively weighted. 
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The regression coefficients derived using log salary 
as the criterion are in Table 12. They are very similar to 
those obtained using raw salary as a criterion, the only 
difference being that Compensable Factor Eight for the 75% 
ma le-25% female group is significant when log salary is 
used and is not when raw salary is the criterion. 
Market conditions may obviously affect some of the 
salaries paid to some jobs within the system by functional 
area. Regression equations were run for each of the 
functional areas of the professional and scientific 
classification with the expectation that R squared values 
would vary by areas that may have more (or less) 
competitive jobmarkets;See Table 13.Two functional 
areas that had the lowest R squared values for log salary 
were Anes Lab and Academic/Research. It is possible that 
these low R squareds are for different reasons, however: 
Ames Lab has a variety of positions that may be considered 
to be in demand. Academic/Res earch has some of those in 
demand positions but also has a relatively large number of 
female-dominated positions. Interestingly, the functional 
area. Computer Center/ADP, an area with many jobs perceived 
to be in much demand had a relatively high R squared value. 
As one of the ancillary analyses to determine the 
seriousness of the mu1tico11inearity problem and to assess 
whether there are eight separate factors that determine 
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T a b l e  1 2  
Regression coefficients (standardized) for the 5 groups 
using log salary as criterion 
Group 
Fac- 90%M-10%F 75%M-25%F- 50%H-50%F 25%M-75%F 10%M-90%F 
tor 
1 .0647 .3452*** .2903* .1641 -2423 
2 . 2414*** .2560*** .0484 .6389*** .2061* 
3 -.0044 .0650 .2464** .3084* .1872 
4 .3668*** .0322 ,4374** .0799 .2029* 
5 .1760** .2471*** -.0314 .0182 .1520 
6 .1674** -.1904*** .1515* .3069 - .25 7 2** 
7 -.1031 .0712 .0423 -.1682 .2292** 
3 .0521 .1897*** -.1548 -.4194***d .1266 
*p <.05. 
**p <.01. 
***p <.001. 
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T a b l e  1 3  
2  
R for the functional area regressions 
Criter ion 
Total 
Area Log Salary Raw Salary Point Count 
Academic/ a 
Research .658 .692 .996 
b 
Ames Lab .640 .640 .998 
c 
Business .793 .813 .999 
Computer 
Center/ADP .820 .854 1.000 
a 
Extension .858 .856 .999 
Information/ c 
Development .815 .7 8 4.99 9 
Student a 
Affairs .889 .881 .997 
a 
Compensable Factor One did not enter the regression 
equat ion. 
b 
Compensable Factor Five did not enter the regression 
equat ion. 
c 
Compensable Factor Seven did not enter the regression 
equat ion. 
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worth in the professional and scientific system, or if 
fewer factors would be as adequate, a principal axis factor 
analysis of the eight compensable factors was done. The 
factor analysis yielded one factor with a mean factor 
loading of .8395. These results (shown in Table 14) 
indicated that the compensable factors share a great deal 
of variance, and that in reality, only one general factor 
determines the variance of job worth within the 
professional and scientific system. Inspection of the 
factor loadings also indicates that Compensable Factor One, 
"Complexity of problems to be solved" would be nearly as 
good as the composite eight factors in determining salary. 
To further investigate the nature of the 
multicollinearity of the compensable factors, factor 
analyses were done for each of the groups of varying sex-
compositions. The derived factors and loadings are in 
Table 15. For the male-dominated, 75% male-25% female, and 
25% male-75% female groups, one factor emerged; however, 
for the 50% male—50% female and female-dominated groups, 
two factors emerged. For both the 50% male—50% female and 
female-dominated groups, the two factors were the same: 
Factor 1 consisted of required minimum qualifications, 
interpersonal relationships, and the effects of independent 
action. Factor 2 is composed of responsibility and 
complexity of problems solved. These factor analyses of 
the female-dominated and 50% male-5'0% female groups would 
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suggest that responsib1ity represents a separate dimension 
for these two groups. 
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T a b l e  1 4  
Principal axis factor analysis of compensable factors 
Factor 1 
Compensable Factor 1 .915 
7 .895 
5 .883 
4 .833 
8  . 8 2 8  
2 .845 
6  . 8 0 2  
3 .715 
Percent o-f variance accounted for by factor analysis: 70.4 
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Factor analyses of the compensable factors for each of the 
selected sex-composition groups 
90% Male-10% Female 
Compensable Factor 
75% Male-25% Female 
Compensable Factor 
Factor 1 
1 .897 
4 .894 
5 .862 
7 .861 
6 .806 
8 .792 
2 .790 
3 ,670 
accounted for: 
Factor 1 
7 .918 
1 .884 
2 .833 
4 .824 
5 .823 
3 .786 
8 .624 
6 .619 
accounted for: 63 .3 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
50% Male—50% Fenale 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Compensable Factor 4 .893 .302 
8  . 8 6 1  . 2 6 2  
2 .750 .398 
3 .720 .219 
7 .656 .411 
1 .491 .821 
5 .435 .725 
6 .117 .631 
Percent of variance accounted for by Factor 1: 61.7 
Factor—2: 8.6 
25% Male—75% Female 
Factor 1 
Compensable Factor 5 ,905 
6 .891 
1 .879 
7 .871 
2 .832 
8 .831 
4 .711 
3 .528 
Percent of variance accounted for: 66.4 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
10% Male^90% Fenale Factor 1 Factor 2 
Compensable Factor 3 .869 .052 
8 .754 .197 
2 .754 .283 
4 .730 .127 
7 .714 .282 
1 .339 .883 
6 .003 .857 
5 .317 .746 
Percent of variance accounted for by Factor 1: 50.4 
Factor 2: 17.6 
Note: All factor analyses were principal axes with 
varimax rotation, with the exception of the fenale-
dominated group which was a principal components analysis 
with a varimax rotation. 
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DISCUSSION 
The results will be discussed with reference to the 
method used to assess comparable worth and to how they 
relate to the theories of occupational segregation. 
Finally, recommendations for further research will be made. 
The proposed research had been intended to test a 
method of determining the comparability of jobs by 
"holding" the sex-composition of jobs "constant". It was 
argued that in the selection of jobs in which there were 
equal numbers of men and women, that one could not consider 
such jobs as "men's jobs" or "women's jobs". It v;as 
further argued that the weights of the factors of the 
regression equation derived from these jobs could be viewed 
as relatively unbiased. The application of this regression 
equation to the other jobs of varied sex-composition 
yielded significant differences in the weights of 
compensable factors for the job which were predominantly 
male or female. 
Men and women are not paid the same for the same 
number of points. The R squared values for salary with job 
components for male-dominated jobs was .75, and .60 for the 
female-dominated jobs, indicating that neither men or women 
are paid precisely by what their point counts would 
predict. This method demonstrated that the compensable 
factors of female—dominated jobs are not as linearly 
related to salary as the compensable factors are for the 
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male-dominated positions. The traditional multiple 
regression analysis approach may not have detected this 
result. As a check, multiple regression analyses were run 
for this sample. See Tables 22, 23, and 24 in the Appendix 
for the regressions done using the males, females, and the 
entire sample. Inspection of the R squared values 
indicates that salaries for both male and female incumbents 
were equally predictable with the usual method. This 
difference suggests that the method proposed here is better 
able to detect differences in predictability. The 
traditional multiple regression analysis approach may thus 
mask important differences. 
Are the compensable factors differentially weighted 
for persons holding male-dominated and female-dominated 
jobs? Yes. The significant F tests clearly indicated that 
the male and female-dominated jobs were weighted 
differently than the benchmark group. Relative to the 
benchmark positions, jobs within the male—dominated 
groupings were all positively related to the extent of 
responsibility exercised in the job, the qualifications one 
brings to the job, and interpersonal relationships 
necessary as part of the job. Predominantly female jobs 
were also positively rewarded in salary for qualifications 
and interpersonal relationships but responsibility was 
negatively related. Apparently, there is more 
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responsibility required for these jobs than these, jobs are 
paid. The job of nurse might serve as an example within 
this group of jobs of the type of responsibility that may 
not be rewarded through salary. Nurses may be as 
important as physicians for patient care, but based on 
salaries, nurses may not be rewarded for their level of 
contribution. Granted, physicians bring greater 
qualifications and education to the job. 
How do these results and the composition of the sample 
relate to the theories of occupational segregation? A scan 
of the female-dominated positions reveals that they are 
jobs traditionally dominated by women: student services 
(e.g, nursing, food service, academic advising) and home 
economics. The male-dominated jobs were also those which 
have traditionally been held by men: engineering, 
chemistry, physics, management and business, animal and 
agricultural sciences. (The 50% male—50% female jobs are a 
composed of a variety of positions from several different 
areas of the the university; computer science, student 
services, extension, academic research.) 
The sample distribution and regression results are 
consistent with several theories of occupational 
segregation. Finding that the sex-composition of a job was 
related to the prediction of salary is consistent with the 
theories of monopsony, taste for discrimination (short 
run), crowding, statistical/information cost (short run). 
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and dual labor narkets. Iowa State University is one of 
the largest enployers in the Ames area for jobs of the type 
that are within the professional and scientific system. It 
is plausible that Iowa State University might be large 
enough to be able to offer low wages and yet obtain 
employees within these job areas (and further determine who 
should do which kinds of jobs). To fully support (or not 
support) this monopsony explanation, one would need to 
determine the proportion of people within the area who are 
working at Iowa State University, and compare the 
prevailing wage rate at Iowa State University with another 
comparable university that is not the major employer in a 
given geographical area. The crowdings hypothesis is also 
supported by the confinement of women to relatively fewer 
jobs than men; whereas the female-dominated jobs numbered 
27, the number of male-dominated jobs was 63. The 
statistical/informat ion approach of occupational 
segregat ion is supported by the larger proportion of women 
(then men) in lower grades. Perhaps Iowa State University 
does not hire women at higher levels of the organization as 
frequently as they may hire men. The proportion of women 
in lower level grades, many of which might be labelled 
entry-level jobs is consistent with the dual labor market 
thesis although the comparability of minimum qualifications 
across regression equations does cast some doubt on this 
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line of reasoning. To adequately test any of these 
theories, however, it would be necessary to have additional 
information not available for this study. For example, do 
Iowa State University administrators perceive women to be 
less productive workers and more likely to turnover? Do 
they act on that perception in the hiring and evaluating of 
women? Are their perceptions accurate, given the actual 
rate of turnover at Iowa State University? 
The results are inconsistent with the human capital 
theory, taste for discrimination (long run), and long run 
statistical/information cost theories of occupational 
segregation. However, one might construe the different 
regression weights and mean values for qualifications for 
the male—dominated positions and female-dominated positions 
to suggest that women bring less human capital to the job. 
If the system of job evaluation is functioning, equal 
qualifications brought to the job should be equally 
rewarded, which is not the case. 
What recommendations regarding comparable worth might 
be made to organizations? It would appear that the most 
practical suggestion to business would be to perform 
careful job analyses of jobs within the organization with 
particular attention to possible bias in the evaluation 
of jobs predominated by one sex. Use of market salaries is 
not likely to win feminist approval, but may be necessary 
business considerations to compete, at least initially. Is 
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there a conpromise position that say be taken in regard to 
issue of comparable worth? Perhaps. Continued equal 
employment opportunity and affirmative action work in 
hiring, placment, retention, promotion, and retraining of 
women in traditionally male-dominated job fields may end 
occupational segregation and wag e discrimination mo r e 
rapidly than might be expected with no intervention. 
As an additional note of interest, the results of the 
regressions against total point count suggest that the 
original Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1976) study was 
adequate in deriving unit weightings (unstandardized 
regression weights) of the compensable factors to predict 
total point count.The system of evaluating job factors 
has survived nearly intact for a decade. It is less clear 
how adequately the original study was in determining 
salaries, or how well the job factors' relationship to 
salary has been maintained. It is likely that some 
adjustments have been made to accommodate positions added 
to the professional and scientific classification system 
and to allow for high demand positions (e.g., TV anchors 
and computer scientist). Just how much adjustment has 
taken place in the past ten years is difficult to assess as 
the original data are not available for comparison. 
There are several limitations to the study which 
should be noted. It is composed of a single sample, and 
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although the sample may be representative of similar 
university professional and scientific personnel, it would 
be unwise to generalize too broadly. Also, the results do 
rely on the assumption that the job evaluation done was 
relatively bias—free. The regression analyses done using 
the total point count as the dependent variable strongly 
suggested that the eight factors perfectly (or nearly 
perfectly) predicted the total point count. This finding 
does lend some support to the reliability of the evaluative 
approach taken, but does not guarantee that the judgments 
were unbiased by factors such as the perception of certain 
types of work as "men's" or "women's" work. 
Summary 
This research investigated the comparable worth of a 
job classification system of positions within an 
university, the professional and scientific classification 
system at Iowa State University. The overall objective was 
to test a proposed method of assessing comparable worth. 
Positions in which there were approximately equal numbers 
of male and female incumbents were selected and used as a 
benchmark group of jobs for comparison to other groups of 
positions dominated by males or by females. Using 
regression analyses, the weights of the compensable factors 
were derived for the benchmark groups of jobs and the male 
and female-dominated groups of jobs. The results 
indicated that the comnpensable factors of the different 
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sex-composicion job groupings were weighted differently and 
bad different levels of predictability. Male-dominated 
positions were rewarded according to levels of 
responsibility and qualifications; female-dominated jobs 
were compensated according to qualifications and 
interpersonal relationships, but responsibility was 
negatively related to salary. The results and sample 
distributions were consistent with several major theories 
of occupational segregation. To adequately test 
occupational segregation, more information would be 
required. The proposed method appears to be a different, 
finer analysis than the traditional multiple regression 
analysis. Personnel and wage compensation administrators 
may find it a useful tool to use in evaluating the 
comparable worth of job classification systems. 
Recommendat ions for Further Research 
As with most research projects, this one has prompted 
many questions to be considered in future research. An 
immediate recommendation is to apply this method, in 
comparison to the traditional multiple regression analysis 
approach to other organizations with many similar positions 
(e.g., universities, research institutes) to determine how 
well this method compares when used in other organizations. 
Another issue raised regards high interdependence of 
the compensable factors used in this classification scheme. 
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It seems likely that such high intercorrelations among job 
components are likely in other organizations as well as 
Iowa State University (cf., Arthur Young and Co., 1984). 
How can the compensable factors be made more independent? 
Should they be? It makes little sense to speak of eight 
different factors in a compensation system if only one 
general factor is operating. Conceptually, it seems that 
some of the factors used in this study should have been 
independent of each other (e.g., functional responsibility 
and minimum qualifications), but they were not. Perhaps 
latent trait will be a useful tool for defining more 
unidimensiona1 and independent job components (Guion, 
1981), although as of yet it has been used primarily in the 
study of human ability. 
In addition to obtaining other organizations to study, 
it may also be helpful to obtain more information about the 
personal characteristics of the workers in the future. 
Although these characteristics should not be significant 
factors in the prediction of salary because the positions 
were being analyzed and not the persons, having additional 
characteristics may be useful in explaining some of the 
unaccounted for variance. Pinpointing additional variance 
may add strength to one's argument for or against wage 
discrimination. For example, tenure at Iowa State 
University, (see Table 25 in the Appendix) indicates that 
time at Iowa State University, whether on the current job 
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or overall stay may be related to one's salary if one is 
female but not if one is male. 
More current research is certainly needed to determine 
if the reliability of job evaluation techniques is as high 
now as it was in the 1940s. It may be. But, potentials 
for bias in making job evaluative judgements need to be 
considered. Males and females both may rate certain female 
linked job components (i.e., interpersonal skills) as less 
valuable than certain male-linked job components (i.e., 
physical strength). In replicating such studies as 
Doverspike et al. (1983), researchers need to include means 
to assess job evaluators' attitudes towards jobs or job 
c omponent s perceived to be better suited for ma les or 
females. A likely starting point is to survey job 
evaluators' biases (blatant or subtle) towards different 
types of work. Additional studies could use well-
controlled studies in which specially designed protocols of 
job descriptions would be developed. Adjectives previously 
rated to be female—linked, male-linked, or sex-neutral 
would be attached to the job components' descriptions. A 
less controlled approach would consist of asking people to 
judge which job factors within job descriptions are more 
descriptive of men or women. 
Although seemingly an economist's domain, the study of 
occupational segregation may hold several areas where 
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psychologists ciay potentially make worthwhile 
contributions, many having to do with people's perceptions. 
For example, are people sensitive to occupational 
segregation? That is, do they recognize its existence, and 
do they make personal (and economic/finaneia1) decisions 
because of occupational segregation? According to the 
human capital theory, for example, boys and girls make 
vocational choices and have expectations that may have 
important implications for their salary levels later. Do 
boys and girls make occupational choices because of the 
traditional sex-composition of the job or because of the 
job tasks? Obtaining elementary, junior high school and 
high school students' perceptions of jobs' content would 
seemingly be a reasonable means of determining young 
people's awareness of the different sex-composition of a 
job and how heavily that awareness determines the 
occupational choice relative to the job itself. 
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APPENDIX; SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
9 0  
T a b l e  1 6  
Titles and numbers of 50 percent male and 50 percent female 
posit ions 
Number of Male-Female 
Incumbents Proportion 
Accounts Manager 2 50—50 
Admissions Counselor 2 50-50 
Area Specialist I 6 50-50 
Assistant State Leader I 7 57-43 
Assistant to Director 2 50-50 
Assistant to the President 2 50-50 
Assistant to the Vice-President 5 40-60 
Coordinator 10 40—60 
Coordinator - Residence Life 8 38—62 
Coordinator - Special Programs 2 50-50 
Counseling Intern 4 50-50 
County Extension Director I 16 63-37 
Data Systems Analyst 2 50-50 
Extension Associate II 2 50-50 
internal Auditor 2 50-50 
Interviewer 2 50-50 
Lab Associate 2 50-50 
Manager - Data Control 2 30-50 
Microcomputer Specialist II 2 50-50 
9 1  
T a b l e  1 6  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
Placement Officer 
Program Coordinator 
Programming Consultant I 
Research Associate 
Senior Program Analyst 
2 50-50 
13 38-62 
2 50-50 
2 50-50 
8 63-37 
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T a b l e  1 7  
Titles and number of fenale-dominated positions 
Number of 
Incumbents 
Ma 1e-F ema1e 
Propert ion 
Academic Advisor I 8 
Academic Advisor II 7 
Academic Advisor 2 
Administrative Assistant 13 
Assistant Building Manager 2 
Assistant Classification Officer 7 
Assistant Food Manager S 
Assistant to the Dean 2 
Editor III 9 
Extension Associate I 2 
Extension Home Economist I 23 
Extension Home Economist II 26 
Extension Home Economist III 17 
Extension Home Economist IV 4 
Extension 4—H Youth Leader II 13 
Financial Aid Advisor 3 
Food Manager 3 
Graphics Designer II 2 
Home Economics Program Assistant 2 
Information Specialist II 4 
Medical Technologist 3 
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
13-87 
0 - 1 0 0  
11-89 
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
1 5-85 
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
0 - 1 0 0  
9 3  
Table 17 (Continued) 
Nurs e 
Program Assistant 
Program Assistant II 
Program Supervisor 
Programmer I 
TV News Producer 
14 0-100 
9 11-89 
2 0-100 
3 0-100 
2 0-100 
2 0-100 
9 4  
T a b l e  1 8  
Titles and numbers of male—dominated positions 
Number of Male-Female 
Incumbents Proportion 
Adjunct Instructor 2 100-0 
Architectural Engineer 3 100-0 
Area Spec ialist IV 9 100-0 
Ass is tant Ceramic Engineer II 3 100-0 
Ass istant Chief Accountant 2 100-0 
Ass istant Engineer II 6 100-0 
Ass istant Head 6 100-0 
Ass istant Maintenance Manager 2 100-0 
As s is tant Metallurgist I 2 10 0-0 
As sis tant Metallurgist II 3 100-0 
Ass is tant Phys icist II 3 100-0 
Ass istant Purchasing Agent 2 100-0 
As sis tant Scientist II 2 100-0 
Ass istant Superintendent 3 100-0 
Ass istant Technical Director 2 100-0 
Assoc iate Chem i s t 15 87-13 
Associate Director 11 91-9 
Associate Eng ineer 4 100-0 
Assoc iate Health Physicist 2 100-0 
Associate Met a1lurg is t 8 100-0 
9 5  
T a b l e  I S  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
Associate Registrar 2 100-0 
Associate Superintendent 2 100-0 
Associate Technical Director 2 100-0 
Buyer III 2 100-0 
Chemi s t 4 100-0 
Chief Accountant 2 100-0 
County Extension Director II 30 100-0 
County Extension Director III 43 98-2 
County Extension Director IV 11 100-0 
Design Engineer 2 100-0 
Director 10 100-0 
Equipment Coordinator 2 100-0 
Estimator 5 100-0 
Executive Director 2 100-0 
Extension Agriculturist III 4 100-0 
Extension 4-H Youth Leader IV 5 100-0 
Field Service Engineer 4 100-0 
Fire Instructor 6 100-0 
Greenhouse Manager 4 100-0 
Group Manager 3 100-0 
Head 6 100-0 
Industrial Specialist I 6 100-0 
Industrial Specialist II 6 100-0 
Information Specialist V 7 86-14 
9 6  
T a b l e  1 8  ( C o n t i n u e d )  
Laboratory Associate 2 100-0 
Lead Software Analyst 2 100-0 
Livestock Research Manager 4 100-0 
Manager 22 91-9 
Metallurgist 2 100-0 
Meteorologist - TV 2 100-0 
Manager — Construction Services 2 100-0 
Manager - Machine Shop Services 2 100-0 
Physicist 6 100-0 
Project Manager 2 100-0 
Research Center Manager 2 100-0 
Research Coordinator 4 100-0 
Research Station Superintendent 16 100-0 
Senior Chemist 3 100-0 
Software Analyst II 7 100-0 
Software Analyst III 2 100-0 
Superintendent 3 100-0 
Supervisor 15 100-0 
Teaching Station Manager 5 100-0 
Writer - Director 4 100-0 
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T a b l e  1 9  
Titles and numbers of 25 percent male and 75 percent 
female positions 
Number of Male-Female 
Incumbents Proportion 
Assistant Chemist I 3 33-67 
Assistant Food Service Manager 4 25-75 
Counselor III 3 33-67 
Editor IV 3 33-67 
Extension 4-II Youth Leader I 26 19-81 
Food Service Coordinator/Manager 3 33—67 
Grant Accountant 3 33-67 
Information Specialist III 6 33—67 
Program Advisor 5 20-80 
Research Associate III 10 30-70 
TV News Reporter 7 29-71 
9 8  
T a b l e  2 0  
Titles and numbers of 75 percent male and 25 percent female 
posit ions 
Number of Male—Female 
Incumbents Proportion 
AM—FM Producer II 6 67—33 
Area Specialist II 22 68-32 
Area Specialist III 32 78-22 
Assistant Athletic Director 3 67—33 
Assistant Director 18 78—22 
Assistant Manager 19 79-21 
Assistant to Director III 3 67-33 
Associate Computer Scientist 4 75-25 
Auditor 3 67—33 
Business Manager 5 80-20 
Buyer II 4 75—25 
Conference Coordinator 3 67-33 
Counselor II 4 75-25 
Manager - Housing Facility 3 67-33 
Physician 7 71-29 
Programmer - Analyst 10 70-30 
Research Associate I 15 73-27 
Research Associate II 19 68-32 
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T a b l e  2 1  
MANOVA and ANOVA sutnciaries for coiap ens ab le factors by the 
five sex composition groups 
Multivariate tests 
Pillai's trace .5805 18. I S * * *  3 2,3 428 
Hotelling's T .9075 24. 18*** 32,3410 
Wilk's lambda .4892 21 . 07*** 32,3150, 
Univariate tests 
Factor Sum of Square s F 
1 2662010.09 105.02 
2 2258448.04 42.45 
3 673993.77 19.96 
4 2348882.79 
- -
41.60 
5 1186743.46 74.25 
6 2859071 .54 146.29 
7 78313.46 49.57 
8 74729 .78 55 .09 
Note: Degrees of freedom for all univariate tests are 
4,861. All univariate F are significant at .05 or better. 
***p <.001. 
1 0 0  
T a b l e  2 2  
Regression coefficients (standardized) for all positions 
using log salary, raw salary, and total point count as 
criteria (n=1257) 
Crit erion 
Fa c- Total 
tor Log Salary Raw Salary Point Count 
a 
1 .28709**** .33263**** .17530 
2 .17123**** .15497**** .25205**** 
3 .12192**** .12420**** .16183**** 
4 .19608**** .16105**** .24162**** 
5 .1744 8**** .193 91**** .19620**** 
6 .07140** .03268 .22233**** 
7 .02637 .03711 .05874**** 
8 -.06014* -.06090* .03736**** 
2 a 
R .872 .868 .997 
a 
Factor One did not enter regression equation. 
*p <.05. 
**p <.01. 
***p <.001. 
****p <.0001. 
1 0 1  
T a b l e  2 3  
Regression coefficients (standardized) for positions held by 
females using log salary, raw salary, and total point count 
as criteria (n=455) 
Fac­
tor Log Salary 
Criterion 
Raw Salary 
Total 
Point Count 
1 .28543**** .3315 3**** .18807 
2 .18826**** .19861**** .25127**** 
3 .21003**** .19935**** .21098**** 
4 . 19492**** .14894*** .25891**** 
5 .16842*** .20531**** .206 7 9**** 
6 -.09834* - .13921** .26359**** 
7 .15 556*** .12744** .05891**** 
8 -.14111*** -.14766*** .01868** 
2 
R .834 .818 
a 
.997 
a 
Factor One did not enter into the regression equation. 
*p <.05. 
**p <.01. 
***p <.001. 
****p <.0001. 
1 0 2  
T a b l e  2 4  
Regression coefficients (standardized) for positions held by 
males using log salary, raw salary, and total point count as 
criteria (n=802) 
Fac­
tor Log Salary 
Criterion 
Raw Salary 
Total 
Point Count 
1 . 24309**** .31954**** . 1 6 6 6  2 * * * *  
2 .19987**** .15769**** .22068**** 
3 . 10520*** .11873*** .17267**** 
4 .20948**** .15210**** .23610**** 
5 . 20972**** .2037 9**** .13 610**** 
6 .06754* .04490 . 150 90**** 
7 -.03808 .00652 .03 936**** 
8 -.02092 -.03853 .03965**** 
2 
R .861 .857 1 .000 
V
 
•!< 
.05. 
* * p  <.01. 
* * * p  <.001. 
p  <.0001. 
1 0 3  
T a b l e  2 5  
Correlations of position factors, total point count, raw 
salary, and log salary with I SU tenure for all groups 
I SU Tenure 
with 
Group 
Fac­
tor 
90%M-10%F 75%M-25%F 50%M-50%F 25%M-75%F 10%M-90%F 
1 .102 .059 .428** .410** . 247** 
2 .183** .110 .365** .53 0** .336** 
3 .152** .178* .286** .279* .171* 
4 .144** .178* .419** .187 . 430** 
5 .163** .082 .363** .395** .341** 
6 .130* .092 .283** .417** -.033 
7 .079 .046 .280** .296* .221** 
8 .108* .298** .341** .331** .158* 
Tot al 
Po int 
Count .170** .152 .443** .453** .347** 
Salary .320** .195 .567** .655** .560** 
Log 
Salary .341** ,273* .556** .656** .563** 
*p <.05. 
**p <.01. 
1 0 4  
Table 26 
Mean factor 
scientific 
points and 
personnel by 
raw salary 
sex 
of professional and 
Ma les Female s Total 
Mean raw salary 27349 .32 20894.55 25012.37 
SD 7620.65 5111.42 7490.66 
Factor 1 357.06 267.32 324.58 
SD 99.69 81.73 103 .03 
Factor 2 467.80 392.63 440 .60 
SD 132.04 97 .63 125.97 
Factor 3 382.28 345.30 368 .89 
SD 103.31 83.79 98.29 
Factor 4 3 73.68 2 9 8.60 346.50 
SD 141.26 102.85 133.61 
Factor 5 349.90 289.12 327 . 90 
SD 81.43 61 .83 80 .40 
Factor 6 281.58 187.66 247.59 
SD 90 .29 79.09 97 .46 
Factor 7 86.16 71 .03 80.68 
SD 23 .55 19.60 23 .36 
Factor 8 59.41 46 .41 54.71 
SD 23 .72 17 .53 22.56 
Total Point Count 2357.86 1898.08 2191.43 
SD 598.32 434.58 587.73 
Sanple N 802 455 1257 
1 0 5  
T a b l e  2 7  
Grade by sex crosstabulation 
Sex 
Gra d e Maie F ena1e 
1 3 3 
2 33 117 
3 162 174 
4 254 106 
5 208 48 
6 102 7 
7 29 G 
8 23 3 
Totals 814 458 
